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IntroductIon 
The creation of a common and truly competitive gas market is one 
of the key objectives of European energy policy, which is intended 
to offer consumers a greater choice of suppliers, lower prices, and 
improve security of supply. According to the European Council de-
cision of February 2011, the process of creating the European Un-
ion’s internal gas market should be completed by the end of 2014. 
Therefore, it is worth summarising the changes which have taken 
place in the gas markets of Central Europe so far. The past few 
years have seen not only a period of gradual ‘marketisation’ of the 
national gas sectors and the implementation of regulations relat-
ed to the creation of a common EU gas market, but also the build-
ing of new gas infrastructure, a redrawing of the gas flow map, 
and changes in the ownership of the Central European gas compa-
nies. Another change in Central Europe is the fact that individual 
states and gas companies are moving away from their traditional 
focus on their national gas markets; instead, they are beginning 
to develop a variety of concepts for the regional integration of 
Central European gas markets. Admittedly these individual inte-
gration projects are at the initial stage of implementation, or even 
at the level of the general concept, but their appearance alone may 
herald a new ‘regional’ stage in the development of gas markets. 
This publication attempts to grasp the main elements of the on-
going transformation of Central Europe’s gas markets, with par-
ticular emphasis on the situation in the markets of the Visegrad 
Group, i.e. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. The 
first part of the report describes the general characteristics of the 
changes in gas markets in the EU, namely the formation of the 
common gas market. The scale of the ‘market revolution’ is illus-
trated by presenting the development of gas hubs in North-West 
Europe. The second part examines the changes in the gas markets 
in Central Europe. It shows the progress of the liberalisation of 
domestic gas markets; the expansion of infrastructure and the 
changes to the gas flow patterns which had been beaten out over 
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decades; the major transformations of ownership in the Central 
European gas companies; and the process of renegotiation of gas 
contracts. The third part concerns the integration of gas markets 
in Central Europe; it discusses the latest trends in the regionalisa-
tion of markets in the European Union; the main concepts of in-
tegration in the region; the biggest obstacles to the integration of 
gas markets; and the prospect of creating a Central European gas 
market.
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tHESES
•	 The gas markets in the European Union are going through 
a process of profound transformation. The era of national mar-
kets, poorly interconnected and dominated by monopolists, 
is coming to an end. An integrated and liberalised market is 
gradually being formed wherein the price of gas is increasing-
ly subject to the free play of supply and demand. The changes 
in the organisation and functioning of the gas markets can 
be clearly seen in the countries of North-West Europe (UK, 
Germany, Benelux) where dynamically developing gas hubs 
operate. These are gradually replacing the existing mecha-
nisms for supplying gas to the markets, i.e. gas supplies within 
long-term oil-indexed contracts. The source of these market 
changes is a legislative effort to liberalise domestic markets 
and build a EU single gas market. The progress being made 
in constructing liquid and competitive gas markets in North-
West Europe is also a result of the economic crisis, which has 
forced gas contracts to become more flexible, and of the pres-
ence of a well-developed and integrated gas network, enabling 
a diversification of the routes and sources of gas supplies. 
•	 The move towards a free-market model of gas markets is also 
being made in Central Europe. The region’s countries have ef-
fectively implemented unbundling, i.e. the separation of gas 
transportation and sales businesses; they have gradually (albeit 
reluctantly) relaxed prices; and adopted an entry-exit system 
which is favourable to the development of competition (the so-
called ‘entry-exit’ zones with virtual points for gas trading). 
Furthermore, almost all the countries in the region have set 
up national gas exchanges. All of these activities have laid the 
foundation for the development of competitive and transparent 
gas markets. However, the Central European markets are still 
far less developed than those in North-West Europe, and have 
much lower liquidity and insufficient competition. Limited ac-
cess to non-Russian sources of gas supplies, the predominance 
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of long-term contracts, and the small size of Central European 
gas markets all contribute to this state of affairs. 
•	 The 2009 gas crisis served as the impetus for the expansion 
and modernisation of gas infrastructure. A number of cross-
border interconnectors were built; specific measures were 
introduced to facilitate the flow of gas (physical and virtual 
reverses); and intensive preparations for further investments 
are also underway. Those carried out so far have increased 
the security of gas supplies to a great extent. However, these 
have led mainly to the diversification of the routes, but not the 
sources of gas supplies. Gas imported from the West, although 
it is formally ‘EU gas’, is mostly of Russian origin. The only in-
vestment in the region which guarantees direct import of gas 
from an entirely new source is the Polish LNG terminal, which 
should come online in 2015. 
•	 The growing Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the deterioration 
of Russia’s relations with the West pose a challenge to the secu-
rity of gas supplies to the Central European countries, which 
are heavily dependent on supplies from Russia. It cannot be 
ruled out that the escalation of the conflict between Russia 
and Ukraine will lead to interruptions in the supply of Rus-
sian gas to the EU. Moreover, recently launched gas reverse 
flows to Ukraine from Poland, Hungary and Slovakia may lead 
to retaliation from Russia. The changing routes of Russian gas 
supplies to Western Europe pose another long-term challenge 
to the security of gas supplies in the region. The Russian strat-
egy of diversifying its export routes and bypassing Ukraine, 
including through the launch of the Nord Stream pipeline and 
plans to build the South Stream pipeline, is undermining the 
transit position of Central Europe, especially Slovakia. 
•	 The development of Western European spot markets has in-
directly empowered Central European gas companies with 
respect to Gazprom. As a result, in recent years the Russian 
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supplier has become reconciled to granting discounts and par-
tially modifying its formulas in long-term contracts for sup-
plying Central European countries. 
•	 In recent years, some Central European countries have seen 
profound ownership changes of their national gas industries. 
At the same time significant differences persist in the own-
ership structures in the gas sectors of each country. While 
Hungary is seeing an ongoing renationalisation of its gas sec-
tor, the Czech Republic is undergoing a process of its gradual 
internationalisation. Slovakia is generally somewhere in be-
tween, but the state’s role in selling gas to customers is grow-
ing. In Poland there has been no fundamental change of own-
ership in the gas sector, and the major gas companies are still 
owned by the state. 
•	 According to the vision of creating a common gas market be-
ing promoted at EU level (the so-called Gas Target Model), the 
national gas markets should merge into larger, closely linked 
market areas. A tendency to regionalisation can also be ob-
served in Central Europe, where there have been projects 
to create a common trading region made up of Austria, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia; as well as a concept of a regional 
gas market made up of the Visegrad Group states (Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary). Nevertheless, the pro-
gress in creating a regional market in Central Europe remains 
slow, and its results are still uncertain. The gas markets in 
different countries are at different levels of development, 
and have distinct characters. An obstacle to their deeper in-
tegration may be the concern that individual countries will 
reduce profits from gas transit, and that some of them may 
wish to maintain control over their sales prices for individ-
ual customers. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that Central 
European countries will evolve into “satellite markets”, and 
instead of creating well-functioning regional market they 
will become individually attached to the more liquid hubs in 
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the West. However, without some form of regional integra-
tion of the Central European markets, it will be much more 
difficult to diversify the supply sources, attract investors and 
strengthen competition. Nor will the Central European gas 
hub be created.
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I. tHE Eu gaS markEt’S nEw arcHItEcturE
For a long time, Europe was a loose network of national gas mar-
kets. On each of them, a single supplier – a vertically integrated 
company, which controlled both the sales and transportation 
of gas – usually occupied a monopoly or dominant position. The 
process of dismantling this quasi-monopolistic market structure 
began in the late 1990s, together with the start of the building of 
a common gas market. 
Initially, the process of creating a common gas market faced enor-
mous obstacles. This was due to the legal difficulties of liberal-
ising network industries, as well as opposition from vertically 
integrated companies and some members of the EU who were 
reluctant to weaken the position of their ‘national’ champions. 
Gradually, however, the liberalisation of the gas markets gath-
ered momentum, and subsequent regulatory changes, including 
the first and second liberalisation packages (1998 and 2003), irre-
versibly changed the market’s structure and the gas companies’ 
way of functioning. A principal role was played by the third liber-
alisation package, which has enforced an effective change in how 
the vertically integrated gas companies operate, and introduced 
a new system for organising market zones which favours the de-
velopment of trade. The third package has also created a new in-
stitutional framework for constructing a single market, through 
the establishment of two institutions: the Agency for the Coopera-
tion of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the European Network of 
Transmission Operators for Gas (ENTSOG)1. 
1 The third liberalisation package includes the following acts concerning the 
field of natural gas: the Directive of the European Parliament and Council 
Directive 2009/73/WE of 13 July 2009 concerning common regulations for 
the internal market in natural gas, repealing Directive 2003/55/WE; the 
Regulation of the European Parliament and Council (EC) No 715/2009 of 
13 July 2009 on conditions for access to natural gas transmission networks, 
and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005; and the Regulation of the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council of 13 July establishing the Agency for Coop-
eration of Energy Regulators.
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1. unbundling and changing the gas companies’ 
business model 
The creation of a new architecture of the EU gas market is asso-
ciated with a fundamental change in the way the gas companies 
operate. The de-monopolisation of EU gas markets proceeded inter 
alia through the implementation of unbundling, i.e. the discon-
nection of the production and sales businesses from transmission. 
This process started on the UK market, where in the 1980s a deep 
deregulation was conducted, and in the mid-1990s the vertically 
integrated British Gas company was broken up. The principle of 
unbundling was then repeated in the EU’s liberalisation packag-
es. Both the first and second packages were drawn up to be quite 
moderate in their approach, and it was only after the adoption of 
the third liberalisation package in 2009 (which came into force in 
March 2011) that the effective separation of transmission from the 
production and sale of gas began. The third package introduced 
three variants of unbundling, and established the European 
Commission’s supervision of their compliance. The package went 
furthest with the process of ownership unbundling (OU), which 
obliges vertically integrated companies to sell their networks or 
withdraw from production and sales operations. The two other 
options – hiving off an independent system operator (ISO) or an 
independent transmission operator (ITO) – allow the vertically 
integrated companies to retain ownership of their networks, but 
at the same time this deprives them of any real influence over 
their management. 
The unbundling requirement has strongly influenced the busi-
ness model of the gas companies operating in the EU. The verti-
cally integrated companies are being dismantled, as evidenced by 
the significant transformations of ownership in the gas sectors of 
the EU. A trend has emerged of vertically integrated companies 
withdrawing from transmission networks and focusing their 
activity on the production and/or sale of gas. Some of the largest 
energy companies in Europe have retreated from transmission 
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activity, including Germany’s RWE and E.ON (which has sold the 
Thyssengas, NET4GAS and OGE operators); Italy’s ENI (which has 
sold its shares in the TENP and Transitgas pipelines), and part-
ly France’s GdF Suez (which has sold its shares in Eustream and 
Fluxys). However, it should be added that their decisions to with-
draw from transmission business were influenced not only by the 
unbundling requirement (some companies had begun to sell off 
their networks even before the third package came into force); an 
important role in these decisions was also played by the economic 
crisis, which forced the corporations to implement energy savings 
programmes and sell some of their assets. 
Moreover, we may note the beginning of EU countries’ transmis-
sion operators expanding internationally, as they have ‘detached’ 
themselves from their traditional markets and are increasingly 
investing in gas infrastructure in other countries. The best ex-
ample is the activity of the Belgian TSO Fluxys, which in addition 
to its domestic market is also investing in transmission infra-
structure in Germany and Switzerland, as well as Greece, Albania 
and Italy (as part of the Trans-Adriatic Gas Pipeline project). The 
Dutch operator Gasunie is also very active internationally, get-
ting involved in transmission in northern Germany, the United 
Kingdom (participation in the BBL pipeline) and the Nord Stream 
project. The gas infrastructure is also enjoying increasing inter-
est from international financial investors. So far this can mainly 
be seen on the German market and in the Czech Republic, where 
the place of the gas companies withdrawing from transmission is 
being taken by investment funds such as Macquarie, Real Assets, 
Allianz and Borealis. This fits in with the global trend of a grow-
ing role for financial investors in network industries, which can 
guarantee profits which are not high, but which are stable. 
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2. reforming the management of transmission systems 
Another important change in Europe’s gas markets is the ongo-
ing reform of the management of transmission systems. Its main 
aim is to level the playing field for the market participants’ access 
to transmission infrastructure, as well as to facilitate gas trade 
between member states. This reform was initiated in 1991, i.e. at 
the time of the adoption of the so-called transit directive. How-
ever, the deeper reforms only began with the adoption of the suc-
cessive liberalisation packages. These introduced the principle of 
Third Party Access (TPA) to infrastructure, which was intended 
to guarantee non-discriminatory access to the infrastructure for 
all market participants. According to the third energy package, 
any exemption from the TPA must be approved not only by the 
national regulatory authority, but also by the European Commis-
sion. This gives additional reinforcement to the regulation. 
The fundamental change introduced by the third energy package 
was the imposition of the obligation to implement the entry-exit 
system in each of the EU member states. This states that market 
participants can independently book capacity rights at the entry 
and exit points from the established market zones. Under the new 
model, a virtual trading point is established in each entry-exit 
zone at which gas is traded in isolation from its physical location 
in the transmission network (see Figure 1). This represents a break 
with previous practice, wherein gas was traded in direct connec-
tion with its physical location in the transmission network. One 
indication of this was charging for transmission in connection 
with the so-called contract paths (the charge was made depend-
ent on the route of transmission). This solution was a barrier to 
the free flow of gas between member states.
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Figure 1. Scheme of the ‘entry-exit’ system
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Source: ‘Study on Entry-Exit Regimes in Gas. Part A: Implementation of Entry-
-Exit Systems’, DNV Kema, July 2013, p. 20.
In addition to the introduction of this new system, the third pack-
age initiated a comprehensive harmonisation of the rules govern-
ing the management of transmission networks. It gave the task 
of preparing 12 network codes to two newly-created institutions: 
the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and 
the European Network of Transmission Operators for Gas (ENT-
SOG). The four most important codes relate to: (a) capacity alloca-
tion mechanisms; (b) gas balancing of transmission networks; (c) 
tariffs; (d) interoperability. The other codes will include inter alia 
principles of network security; connection to the network; third 
party access; data exchange; and settlement of accounts 2. 
So far two of the codes have been adopted: the code for trans-
mission capacity allocation mechanisms (October 2013) and the 
code for balancing the transmission system (March 2014). The 
2 Despite the network codes, the Commission’s regulation concerning Con-
gestion Management Procedures was also of key importance. See the Deci-
sion by the Commission of 24 August 2012 on amending Annex I to Regu-
lation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament, and of the Council on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks. 
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latter sets out principles for network operators to communicate 
forecast and survey information among themselves, in terms of 
the amount of gas in the transmission network. Of much greater 
importance for regional integration is the code for capacity allo-
cation mechanisms, which predicts that transmission operators 
will offer bundled capacity products at interconnection points 
between EU member states. Previously it had been necessary 
to reserve capacity for the interconnector on both sides of the 
border, which complicated the transmission of gas. According to 
the code, the sale of transmission capacity should take place only 
within the framework of the auction system. This solution is in-
tended to optimise the use of the interconnectors’ transmission 
capacity, and to facilitate trade between the zones (hub-to-hub 
trading). 
The code of capacity allocation mechanisms is revolutionising 
the mechanism of gas transmission via interconnectors. Al-
though it will only come into force November 2015, intensive 
preparations for its implementation in pilot projects are al-
ready being made. The most important of these is the PRISMA 
online platform for gas capacity booking, established in early 
2013, whose shareholders are the leading Western European 
transmission system operators (23 companies) in eight mem-
ber states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, France, 
Germany, Great Britain and Italy. The PRISMA company is ac-
tively seeking to become a pan-European auction platform for 
reserving capacity. Due to the high cost of participation in the 
PRISMA platform, other transmission operators are develop-
ing their own auction platforms. Operators in Central Europe 
are the most active in this area. The Polish transmission opera-
tor Gaz-System introduced an auction mechanism as the pri-
mary means of allocating capacity to its transmission points in 
the second half of 2013 (relatively early, by EU standards). The 
information system via which the auctions are performed was 
transformed into a GSA auction platform in mid-2014. Capacity 
products related to the Polish-Czech connector will be sold via 
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the platform3. The Hungarian transmission operator FGSZ is 
also preparing its own platform for capacity allocation, which 
is designed to sell capacity on the Hungarian-Romanian bor-
der. This should have been launched in the second half of 2013, 
but the start was delayed for unclear reasons. 
3. the flourishing of gas hubs 
The adoption of the third liberalisation package coincided with 
the growing importance(mainly in North-West Europe) of mech-
anisms for delivering gas to market via gas hubs, at which the 
price of the raw material is established as a result of the free play 
of supply and demand (the so-called gas-to-gas competition). This 
represents a breakthrough in the gas trade. So far, the dominant 
mechanism for supplying gas to the European markets had been 
long-term contracts indexed to prices on the oil market. The key 
suppliers to the European market (including Russia’s Gazprom, 
Norway’s Statoil and Algeria’s Sonatrach) justified the need to 
sign oil-indexed long-term contracts by their considerable ex-
penditure on production and transport infrastructure, and the 
fact that the searches for oil and natural gas often run in parallel. 
In turn, the linkage of gas prices in gas supply contracts to those 
on the oil market resulted from the nature of electricity genera-
tion in Western Europe4. 
The situation began to change with the implementation of new 
solutions in the gas trade, including the designation of special 
points within the grids (hubs) where gas was to be sold. A pioneer 
of this change was Great Britain, which in 1996 created the first 
3 Gas-System and NET4GAS agreed to offer bundled capacity at the Cieszyn 
IP at the new capacity auction platform GSA. See http://en.gaz-system.pl/
centrum-prasowe/aktualnosci/informacja/artykul/201873/
4 In the 1950s, the production of electricity in Western Europe was based al-
most exclusively on petroleum products (fuel oil in particular), for which 
there were no substitutes (until natural gas came into use). So when energy 
producers drew up contracts for gas supplies, they were interested in link-
ing their prices for gas to those on the oil markets.
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virtual point of sale of gas in the European Union, named the Na-
tional Balancing Point (NBP). Further countries established their 
own gas hubs in succession: Belgium (2000), Germany (2002), the 
Netherlands and Italy (2003), France (2004) and Austria (2005)5. 
Not all the hubs were virtual in nature from the beginning; there 
were also physical hubs, i.e. specially designated points in the 
transmission network which had high capacity, allowing large 
amounts of gas to be exchanged. Typical ‘physical’ hubs included 
Zeebrugge in Belgium (until early 2012) and Baumgarten in Aus-
tria (until early 2013). In connection with the reform of the entry-
exit tariff model, all hubs currently operating in the EU have been 
organised as virtual points of gas sales. The understanding of the 
term ‘hub’ itself is also changing; increasingly often it refers di-
rectly to the entire entry-exit zone. 
In recent years, the role of hubs in the European gas trading sys-
tem has increased noticeably. The trading volume at the gas hubs 
operating in Europe amounted to 650 bcm per year in 2003; the 
vast majority of trade took place at the British NBP (611 bcm). 
Within a decade, the volume at the largest hubs of gas tripled, to 
the level of 1905 bcm per year (1271 bcm of it was traded at british 
NBP, see Figure 2). The British NBP is still considered the most liq-
uid hub in the European Union (in 2012, nearly 70% of the trading 
volume at EU hubs was carried out at the NBP); however, turno-
ver at the continental hubs is rising, especially at the Dutch Title 
Transfer Facility (TTF) and two German hubs, GASPOOL and Net-
Connect Germany (NCG).
5 Patrick Heather, ‘Continental European Gas Hubs: Are They Fit for Pur-
pose?’, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, June 2012, p. 4.
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Figure 2. Net traded (nominated) volumes at European gas hubs, 
2003-2012 (bcm)
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Source: ‘Gas. Medium Term Gas Market Report 2013, Market Trends and Pro-
jections to 2018’, International Energy Agency, Paris, p.170.
The role of hubs in the field of physical gas supplies to individual 
EU markets is also growing. The total physical delivery via hubs 
to EU countries rose from 64 bcm of gas per year in 2003 (52.5 bcm 
of it was traded at british NBP) to 274 bcm in 2012 (88 bcm of it at 
NBP, see Figure 3). Currently, all physical supplies to the British 
market are delivered via the NBP hub. The situation at the ‘con-
tinental’ hubs is slightly different. In 2011, physical gas supplies 
via hubs made up 58% of the total demand from Austria, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, France, Germany and Italy. However, this con-
stitutes a huge increase; five years earlier, only 8% of these coun-
tries’ total demand had been supplied via gas hubs6.
6 ‘Gas. Medium Term Gas Market Report 2012, Market Trends and Projections 
to 2017’, International Energy Agency, Paris, p. 149.
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Figure 3. Physical deliveries of gas at European gas hubs, 
2003-2012 (bcm)
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Source: ‘Gas. Medium Term Gas Market Report 2013, Market Trends and Pro-
jections to 2018’, International Energy Agency, Paris, p.170. 
The development of hubs has changed the old ways in which the 
gas markets used to function in Europe. Firstly, the habit of mak-
ing contracts indexed to the prices in oil markets is being replaced 
by indexing them to market prices (‘spot’ prices, set at the hubs). 
A survey conducted by the International Gas Union indicates the 
very high dynamics of this process. In 2005, 78% of the volume of 
gas to Europe was supplied under contracts indexed to oil mar-
ket prices, while only 15% of fell within market indexation. Mean-
while, in 2012, 53% of the volume of gas to Europe was supplied 
within contracts based on the market links, while gas delivered 
under contracts linked to oil prices accounted for only 43%7. 
Another consequence of the development of spot markets is a move 
away from long-term contracts. Currently in Europe virtually no 
contracts in excess of 15 years are being concluded, while in the 
7 ‘Wholesale Gas Price Survey – 2014 Edition, A global review of price forma-
tion mechanisms 2005-2013’, International Gas Union, May 2014, p. 25.
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1990s it was common to sign contracts for periods of 20 to 30 years. 
This is due to the development of gas hubs as well as the high level 
of uncertainty among large consumers about the further evolu-
tion of gas markets. The growing role of hubs is also squeezing the 
gas storage business and changing the way it operates. Previously, 
the reservoirs sold gas in the winter and bought it in the summer. 
Now, however, their role in the seasonal balancing of supply and 
demand has decreased, because the hubs offer an attractive alter-
native to storage in ensuring the flexibility of supply.
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II. tHE tranSformatIon of gaS markEtS 
In cEntral EuropEan countrIES 
The gas markets in Central Europe, as is the case throughout the 
EU, have undergone a process of profound transformation in re-
cent years. By separating the transport and sale of gas, freeing 
prices and implementing new tariff models, the  national gas sec-
tors have been gradually liberalised. The second process, which is 
a direct consequence of the gas crisis of 2009, involves the physi-
cal integration of the Central European markets through the con-
struction of cross-border interconnectors and the implementation 
of new mechanisms to improve gas flows in the region. Character-
istically, these moves have been accompanied by a change in the 
traditional gas flow patterns, such as the unprecedented launch 
of supplies from Central European countries to Ukraine. Other 
changes include significant transformations of ownership in the 
region’s gas companies, and the progressive renegotiation of gas 
contracts. 
1. gradual liberalisation 
The foundations for the development of competitive gas markets 
in Central Europe were laid by the smooth implementation of 
the rules for the separation of transport and sale (unbundling). 
Among the Visegrad Group countries, unbundling was first in-
troduced by Poland and Hungary. In 2004 both countries broke 
up their national gas champions: the Gaz-System company came 
out of the Polish Oil and Gas Company (PGNiG) in Poland, and 
the FGSZ company from MOL in Hungary. It is worth mention-
ing that Gaz-System is fully owned by the state, while FGSZ is 
wholly owned by the MOL Group, in which the state has around 
25% of the shares. In 2006, the independent transmission op-
erators in the Czech Republic and Slovakia were established. It 
should also be noted that the Czech and Slovak gas industries 
had already been privatised in 2001. In the case of Slovakia, the 
privatisation included the sale of 49% of the managerial control 
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shares of the monopoly company SPP to the French GdF (cur-
rently GdF Suez) and the German E.ON. The Czech privatisa-
tion included a package sale of the Transgaz company, as well as 
a number of distribution companies (which were de facto sales 
companies), to Germany’s RWE. 
The adoption of the third liberalisation package brought about 
a new wave of changes in the field of unbundling. Currently, the 
most widespread model in Central Europe is that of the independ-
ent transmission operator (ITO), which is used in the Austrian, 
Czech, Slovak and Hungarian markets. The Polish case may be 
thought of as a mixed model. The Polish transmission operator 
Gaz-System, to which the ownership unbundling (OU) approach 
was applied, is fully independent. At the same time, Gaz-System 
acts as the independent system operator (ISO) of the Polish sec-
tion of the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline8. The wide dissemination of 
the ITO model in Central Europe is due to the desire to maintain 
the presence of strong energy companies in the gas sectors. The 
ITO model presupposes that a vertically integrated company may 
retain its ownership of transmission networks. However, any op-
erator which is part of such a company must observe a number 
of restrictive procedures that guarantee the independence of its 
decisions from the influence of the parent company. Nevertheless 
the ownership unbundling model, which in Central Europe has 
only been applied in Poland (with the exception of the Polish sec-
tion of Yamal-Europe pipeline), is still seen as the ideal method of 
encouraging the development of competition. 
In addition to the changes in the organisational models of the 
gas sector, the gas prices in different countries are gradually 
being relaxed. The first country in Central Europe to fully lib-
eralise prices on the wholesale and retail markets was Austria, 
8 Data relating to the unbundling regimes of individual operators can be 
found at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/interpretative_notes/
certification_en.htm
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which had already completed the process in 2002. In the Vise-
grad Group countries this process took longer, with Poland bring-
ing up the rear. The Czech Republic relaxed its gas prices for in-
dustrial consumers in 2005, and two years later it did the same 
for households; it is thus the only country of the Visegrad Group 
which has no price regulation on its gas market. Poland, Slovakia 
and Hungary still maintain price regulations for households and 
small- and medium-sized enterprises, although it should be em-
phasised that regulating prices for these customers is not in itself 
contrary to EU law (as was confirmed by the judgment in the so-
called Federutility case). Price regulation on the wholesale market 
in Slovakia was completely abolished in 2005, while in Hungary 
a gas release programme was started in 2006; this involved the 
compulsory sale of 1 bcm of gas per year under the auction system 
by the market-dominant company E.ON Földgáz. This programme 
was carried out in the years from 2006 to 20139, and in the mean-
time price regulation on the Hungarian wholesale market was 
completely halted. 
Price regulation on the wholesale market has remained in opera-
tion the longest in Poland, although regulation has been abolished 
in some areas. In February 2013, it became possible for traders to 
obtain exemption from price regulation. However, the company 
must then submit an application for exemption from price regu-
lation to the energy regulatory office. A partial lifting of tariffs 
on the wholesale market, including gas traded on the gas stock 
exchange, took place in June 2013. The continued price regulation 
on the wholesale market meant that the European Commission 
initiated an investigation into a suspected infringement of EU law 
9 The gas release programme in Hungary was part of the sale by the MOL 
company of Földgáz to the German company E.ON. For more, see C. Bartok, 
S. Moonen, P. Lahbabi, A. Paolicchi, M. De La Mano, ‘A combination of gas 
release programmes and ownership unbundling as remedy to a problematic 
energy merger: E.ON / MOL’, Merger Control, EC Competition Policy News-
letter, Number 1, 2006.
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in June 2013, and referred the matter to the EU’s Court of Justice10. 
This is yet another case brought to the Court against Poland, in 
the absence of proper implementation of the provisions of the 
third liberalisation package. 
The relaxation of prices was one of the factors, besides increased 
opportunities to import gas, which contributed to the rise in 
competition among gas suppliers in each market. This process 
has been most apparent in the Czech Republic, where the main 
supplier RWE’s share of total deliveries fell from 99% in 2006 to 
51.5% in 2011. RWE is losing its market share to smaller provid-
ers, such as the Pražská plynárenská, Vemex, ČEZ, E.ON and SPP 
companies. Increased competition can also be seen on the Slovak 
market. The traditional supplier, SPP, supplied 100% of gas to the 
market in 2008, while in 2011 it only covered 77%. The Slovak com-
pany’s main competitor is RWE. In the case of Hungary, the major 
supplier is E.ON Földgáz Trade. However, thanks to the start in 
2006 of the gas release programme, other firms are now operat-
ing on the market, including GdF Suez. In the case of Poland, the 
state-owned PGNiG is still the dominant player; in 2013 it still sold 
over 95% of the gas supply on the domestic market. Other entities 
have a very small share of the market there, and are focused on 
the sale of gas to large industrial customers. 
In addition to implementing unbundling and partially moving 
away from price regulation, the Central European countries have 
reformed the organisation of the transmission system, a move 
which is expected to contribute to the formation of liquid whole-
sale markets. The main tool for achieving this goal is the imple-
mentation of a new tariff model (entry-exit zones). Most of the 
Central European countries’ gas markets are organised as a sin-
gle entry-exit zone. The exception is Poland, where the Yamal 
10 ‘Internal gas market: the Commission takes Poland to court over regulated 
gas prices for business consumers’, Brussels, 20 June 2013. See http://eu-
ropa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-580_en.htm
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pipeline operates as a separate entry-exit zone. The situation in 
Austria is also a separate case, where there are three entry-exit 
zones: the eastern zone with CEGH hub, covering more than 90% 
of the customers, and two small areas in the west of the country 
(which do not have any virtual trading points). 
The establishment of the entry-exit zones was accompanied by the 
establishment of virtual gas trading points. In the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, these operate under the name of VOB; in Hungary 
MGP, in Poland VTP-Gaz System, and in Austria under the name 
CEGH. The biggest gas trade turnover in Central Europe takes 
place at the Austrian virtual trading point (hub) CEGH, where 
turnover amounted to 393 TWh (nearly 35 bcm) in 2013. At the 
Austrian hub, the vast majority of transactions take place within 
the framework of OTC (‘over the counter’) trading. However, an 
Austrian gas exchange also operates, with a turnover of 13 TWh 
in 2013 (1.2 bcm)11. In the Visegrad Group countries (with the ex-
ception of the Czech Republic), trading is still mainly carried out 
through transactions at physical locations in the transmission 
network, and not at virtual trading points. The low usage of vir-
tual trading points is due to the markets’ structural character-
istics, especially the functioning of long-term contracts between 
suppliers and customers, as well as the underdeveloped market 
for balancing services (transactions enabling contractual balance 
and the physical obligations of the company selling the fuel gas). 
The beginning of virtual trading points opened the way for the es-
tablishment of gas exchanges. At the start of 2013 a gas exchange 
(CEEGEX) was launched in Hungary; the Polish power exchange 
(POLPX) started to trade gas in early 2013; while in December 
2013 the sale of gas commenced through the power exchange in 
the Czech Republic (PXE). In Slovakia, there is no gas exchange, 
11 ‘CEGH: Exchange traded gas volumes almost quadrupled compared to 2012’. 
See http://www.cegh.at/cegh-exchange-traded-gas-volumes-almost-quad-
rupled-compared-2012
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nor are there any plans to start one. At the end of 2012 the Slo-
vak transmission operator Eustream acquired a 15% stake in the 
Austrian hub CEGH, which may indicate that it will treat this as 
a destination for gas trading. Past trading on the gas exchanges 
indicates low liquidity of the markets in comparison with West-
ern European exchanges (see Table 1). Only three transactions 
were concluded throughout 2013 on the Hungarian CEEGEX, and 
their total volume did not exceed 1 million m3. This situation has 
not changed in the first half of 2014. The Czech power exchange 
PXE only supports the gas futures market, and operates under an 
agreement with the Austrian CEGH. At the same time, the spot 
market (Intra Day and Day-Ahead Market) in the Czech Repub-
lic has been operating since 2010, when the electricity operator 
OTE also took over the operation of the gas market. Sales of gas 
via OTE have been low, however, and its main role is providing 
balancing services. High growth can be seen on the Polish gas ex-
change. In 2013 the volume of trade amounted to 215 million m3, 
while in the first half of 2014 the total turnover of gas has already 
reached 5.2 TWh (c. 570 million m3)12. In July 2014 alone, the vol-
ume of gas trading on the POLPX amounted to 5.3 TWh13, i.e. the 
entire turnover in the first half of 2014. This recent surge might 
be the result of establishing PGNiG Retail Turnover, a new com-
pany within PGNiG, which will be engaged solely in retail trade. 
The company was established so that PGNiG would comply with 
the public trading obligation which was introduced in 201314. 
12 ‘Polish Power Exchange – domestic market and position in Europe’, Warsaw, 
1 July 2014. See http://tge.pl/en/340/informacja-o-towarowej-gieldzie-en-
ergii-i-rynku-energii-w-polsce
13 Summary of July 2014 on the gas markets of the Polish Power Exchange, See 
http://www.tge.pl/en/27/aktualnosci/484/podsumowanie-lipca-2014-r-na-
rynkach-gazu-towarowej-gieldy-energii-rekordowe-obroty-na-rynku-ter-
minowym-oraz-dalszy-spadek-cen-paliwa
14 Public trading obligation is a requirement to sell a certain portion of gas 
through the gas exchange. The compulsory sale of gas via exchange was set 
at the level of 30% of the gas introduced into the network in 2013; this fig-
ure will reach 40% in 2014, and 55% from 2015. Companies importing gas on 
a small scale, as well as gas sent by transit, are excluded from this require-
ment; as a consequence, the term de facto only applies to the PGNiG company.
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Table 1. Turnover on gas exchanges in selected EU countries 
in 2013 (TWh)
Country Belgium Czech Republic Poland Denmark Austria Italy France Germany Netherlands
Volume 
(TWh) 0.2 0.2 2.4 9.2 13.2 41.4 70.3 110 150
Source: Data from gas exchanges
2. development of the infrastructure 
The second great process, after the liberalisation of the national 
markets, has been the intensive development of the gas infra-
structure and the implementation of mechanisms to facilitate the 
free flow of gas between states. Never had such a large number of 
cross-border interconnectors and new gas pipelines been launched 
in Central Europe as in the past five years. The main investments 
include the construction of the Gazelle gas pipeline in the Czech 
Republic, the LNG terminal in Poland (to be launched in mid-2015) 
and gas interconnectors between the following countries: Poland-
Czech Republic, Slovakia-Hungary, Hungary-Croatia and Hunga-
ry-Romania. Moreover, gas reverses were launched on the Broth-
erhood and Yamal-Europe major transit pipelines, which allow gas 
supplies to be sent to Central Europe from the west. 
The impetus to develop the infrastructure was the gas crisis of 
January 2009, when the supply of Russian gas to the EU was inter-
rupted for 19 days. The crisis was caused by the dispute between 
Russia and Ukraine, a country which plays a key role in the transit 
of Russian gas to the EU. The shock caused by stopping the supply 
was huge, because there had never been such a long interruption 
of Russian gas supplies to Europe even during the Cold War (an 
earlier gas crisis in 2006 involved a three-day break in deliver-
ies). This was felt particularly strongly in Central Europe, as it had 
limited opportunities to import gas from directions other than the 
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East, and was almost entirely dependent on Russian gas supplies. 
The crisis also highlighted the need to develop effective anti-crisis 
mechanisms. During the gas crisis new solidarity mechanisms 
were hastily introduced, including gas reverses along the Broth-
erhood gas pipeline from the Czech Republic to Slovakia. 
In Central Europe, the greatest progress in enhancing the oppor-
tunities for import has been made by Poland and the Czech Repub-
lic. In Poland a virtual reverse flow along the Yamal pipeline was 
launched in late 2011. This virtual reverse allowed the delivery of 
2.3 bcm per year; formally the gas was supplied from the west, but 
in practice it was collected at the Polish-Belarusian border. In 2011 
a Czech-Polish gas interconnector was opened (with a capacity of 
0.5 bcm per year). In 2013, the Polish-German connector’s capacity 
was increased (from 0.9 to 1.5 bcm per year). At the beginning of 
2014, the virtual reverse on the Yamal pipeline became operation-
al with firm capacities (it had previously worked on an interrupt-
ible basis), and also allowed the transfer of gas within a physical 
reverse capacity of 5 bcm per year. However, this can only be ac-
tivated in the event that the supply from the east is stopped. As 
a result of these investments, Poland’s ability to import gas from 
the west rose from 9% in 2009 to 70% of total import needs in 2014.
On the Czech market, the launch of the Gazelle pipeline in Janu-
ary 2013 played a key role. This pipeline, whose capacity is 30 bcm 
per year, is primarily used for the transit of Russian gas from the 
Nord Stream and OPAL pipelines to southern Germany (via the 
Czech Republic). The pipeline can also serve as a supply route for 
the Czech market. The European Commission granted the Gazelle 
gas pipeline complete exemption from the TPA rule. However, 
a direct response to the gas crisis came in the form of the reverse 
of the Czech section of the Brotherhood pipeline, launched in 2011, 
which made physical delivery from the Czech Republic to Slova-
kia possible. Preparations to build interconnectors between the 
Czech Republic and Austria also began, as there are still no cross-
border links between the two countries. 
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Meanwhile in the case of Slovakia, the launch of gas reverse flows 
from the Czech Republic (2009) and Austria (2011) has played an 
important role. These have allowed the delivery of almost 9 bcm of 
gas annually from the west to Slovakia. In the case of Hungary, the 
gas crisis has been directly responsible for significant investment 
in gas storage15, as has the start of work on the construction of 
a Slovak-Hungarian gas interconnector, the latter to be launched 
in 2015. At the same time, work on the construction of gas links 
with Romania and Croatia, which had begun even before the cri-
sis broke out, was accelerated, and the links were completed in 
2010 and 2011 respectively. 
In addition to the investments already completed, a whole se-
ries of further projects are being planned and implemented (see 
Table 2 and Map on page 56). From the point of view of energy 
security, the most important projects include the plan for the 
construction of the North-South corridor, which includes the 
construction of an LNG terminal in Świnoujście (this is being 
completed, ready for launch in 2015), and interconnectors be-
tween Slovakia-Hungary (launching in 2015), Poland-Slovakia 
and Poland-the Czech Republic. The projects included within 
the framework of the North-South corridor have been granted 
the EU status of Projects of Common Interest (PCI), which means 
they can apply for funding from the EU budget within the Con-
necting Europe Facility programme. Another important project 
in the region is the South Stream pipeline project, strongly sup-
ported by Austria and Hungary, which is intended to send Rus-
sian gas across the Black Sea to Central and Southern Europe 
(its total capacity is expected to reach 63 bcm annually). South 
Stream is de facto a new transport corridor, which when imple-
mented will lead to significant changes in the existing transmis-
sion routes of Russian gas. The project has met strong opposition 
15 As a result, Hungary has the largest gas storage capacity of the Visegrad 
Group countries; its total storage capacity at the beginning of 2014 amount-
ed to 6.17 bcm. The storage capacities of the other V4 countries are: Czech 
Republic, 3.27 bcm; Slovakia, 3.18 bcm; Poland, 2.5 bcm.
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from some EU member states and the European Commission, 
claiming that it will lead to the region’s greater dependence on 
Russian gas supplies, and that the intergovernmental agree-
ments on its use would violate EU law.
Table 2. Infrastructure investments being implemented 
or planned for Central Europe
project number on map
capacity  
(bcm annually) State of implementation
LNG terminal 
in Świnoujście 
(Poland)
1 5, upgradeable to 7.5
Finalisation of construc-
tion work, launch in 2015.
Slovakia-Hun-
gary connector 2
4.2 to Hungary,
1.7 to Slovakia
Construction completed, 
connector launch at the 
start of 2015.
Poland- 
-Lithuania 
connector
3
0.95 to Poland,
2.25 to 
Lithuania
Planning phase com-
pleted. Final investment 
decision to be taken in 
2015, with prospect of 
implementation in 2018. 
Project has PCI status 
and has received funding 
under the TEN-E.
Poland-Czech 
Republic con-
nector (Stork 2)
4
6.5 to Poland
5 to Czech 
Republic
Planning phase completed. 
Final investment decision 
in 2017, with prospect of 
implementation in 2019. 
Project has PCI status and 
is part of the North-South 
corridor.
Poland- 
-Denmark 
pipeline 
(Baltic Pipe)
5 3 in both direc-tions
Planning phase com-
pleted. Final investment 
decision in 2015, with 
prospect of implementa-
tion in 2020.
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project number on map
capacity  
(bcm annually) State of implementation
Poland-Slovakia 
connector 6
4.7 to Slovakia;
from 4.3 to 
5.7 to Poland 
(according to 
Eustream, up 
to 9.7)
Planning phase complet-
ed. Final decision in 2017, 
with prospect of imple-
mentation in 2019.
Poland- 
-Germany 
(Lasów)
7
Increase 
capacity to 2.5, 
to Poland
Final investment decision 
planned for 2015, with the 
prospect of implementa-
tion in 2021.
Czech Republic-
Austria (BACI) 8
8.5 in both 
directions
Preliminary planning; 
project may begin in 2019.
Czech Republic- 
-Austria 
(connection to 
Oberkapel)
9 1.8 in both directions Preliminary planning
Physical reverse 
on the Hunga-
ry-Romania 
connector
10
0.4–1.7 to 
Hungary,
2.5 to Romania
Preliminary planning
Hungary-Slove-
nia connector 11
1.5 in both 
directions
Planning underway; final 
investment decision in 
2015.
South Stream 
pipeline in 
Hungary and 
Austria
12 30–32
Project uncertain, in con-
nection with the dispute 
concerning compliance 
with EU law.
Slovakia-
-Ukraine 
connector
13 10 to Ukraine
Work started in 2013. 
Pipeline launched in Sep-
tember 2014 (deliveries 
on an interruptible basis), 
and deliveries with firm 
capacities are planned as 
of March 2015.
Sources: ETSOG GRIP CEE 2014–2023, Annex B: Infrastructure Projects;  com-
panies’ reports
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As a result of the expansion of the transmission infrastructure, 
and the implementation of gas reverses by the Visegrad Group 
countries, the security level of gas supplies has improved signifi-
cantly. All of them meet the current N-1 infrastructure standard, 
which has been defined in the European Parliament and Council 
Regulation no. 994/2010 concerning measures to safeguard the 
security of natural gas supplies (the ability to meet the statisti-
cally highest level of daily demand for gas upon the disconnec-
tion of the largest supply sources). The highest N-1 rate in 2013 was 
held by the Czech Republic, which can cover more than 250% of 
demand if the largest supply source is turned off. Slovakia’s rate 
is slightly lower, but still over 200%, while Poland and Hungary 
exceeded the required threshold of 100%16. The relatively low N-1 
rates in the cases of Poland and Hungary will rise after the open-
ing of the LNG terminal in Poland, when the Slovakia-Hungary 
interconnector is activated, and when the Hungarian-Romanian 
reverse begins. 
It should be noted, however, that increasing the capacity of the 
transmission infrastructure to import gas from the west does not 
automatically lead to a diversification of gas supply sources. From 
a formal point of view, the gas imported by the Central European 
countries from other EU countries is ‘EU gas’ (see Table 3), but 
for example, the vast majority of the gas purchased from West-
ern companies (e.g. German) has been previously purchased 
from Russia’s Gazprom. Likewise, a large amount of gas in the gas 
hubs in Germany and Austria also originates in Russia. In fact, 
the only infrastructure investment being carried out in the Vise-
grad Group countries which can guarantee direct deliveries of 
gas from a completely new source is the Polish LNG terminal in 
Świnoujście.
16 Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Report on the Implementation of 
Regulation 994/2010 and its contribution to solidarity and preparedness for 
gas disruptions in the EU’, Brussels, 16 October 2014, p.8, http://ec.europa.eu/
energy/doc/energystresstests_securityofgassupplysegulation_report.pdf 
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Table 3. Natural gas supplies to Central European states in 2012 
(TWh)
poland czech republic Slovakia Hungary
Supplier
Russia 103.6 49.6 46.2 85.8
Norway - 9.6 - -
EU 26.2 18.2 12.2 -8.8*
Domestic 
production 49.5 1.7 0.9 23.4
Total 
supplies to 
national 
market**
176.9 86.3 55.3 107.4
Share of 
Russian gas 
in imports
81% 58.5% 85% 58%
Share of 
Russian 
gas in total 
supplies
58.5% 57.5% 83.5% 80%
Sources: Eurogas Statistical Report 2013, p. 6; * Negative value indicates gas 
exports from Hungary to other EU countries; ** Total deliveries taking into 
account changes in the level of storage 
3. new gas flow patterns 
The past three years have also seen a change in the main direc-
tions of the flow of Russian gas in Central Europe. The most im-
portant change is the significant drop in transit of Russian gas 
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through Slovakia, in connection with the launch of the Nord 
Stream pipeline. After the first branch of the Nord Stream pipe-
line was opened in November 2011, a significant amount of Rus-
sian gas was transferred to it, before it flowed westwards via Slo-
vakia along the Brotherhood pipeline. Whereas in 2011 the Slovak 
transmission pipeline amounted to 74 bcm annually, a year later it 
had fallen by 25% to 56.5 bcm. In 2013, the transfers via the Slovak 
bus rose slightly to 58.5 bcm per year17. As for the transit of Rus-
sian gas via Poland and Hungary, no significant differences have 
been observed in recent years. In the case of the Czech Repub-
lic, the drop in supplies from Slovakia was offset by an increase 
in supply from Germany. Gas flows through the Czech Republic 
increased significantly after the Gazelle pipeline was activated. 
There was also a significant increase in the flow of gas from the 
Czech Republic to Slovakia18. 
The downward trend in the transit of Russian gas via the Brother-
hood pipeline appears to be permanent. Gazprom will certainly 
continue its strategy of diversifying export routes and bypassing 
Ukraine, and thus reducing its transmission via Slovakia. The 
possibility of diverting gas from Brotherhood to the Nord Stream 
is still high; 23 bcm, i.e. 42% of capacity, was sent via the Nord 
Stream route in 2013. Nevertheless, Gazprom has still not received 
permission for the Opal pipeline (an extension to the Nord Stream 
gas pipeline) to be exempted from the TPA, on which greater use 
of the Nord Stream pipeline will depend in the future. If the South 
Stream gas pipeline is completed, a significant decrease in Rus-
sian gas transit via the Brotherhood pipeline will be inevitable. 
A new phenomenon regarding gas flows in Central Europe is the 
deliveries to Ukraine from Poland (launched in late 2012), Hungary 
17 Eustream, Annual Report 2013, p. 8.
18 ‘ACER/CEER. Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal. Elec-
tricity and Natural Gas Markets in 2012’, November 2013; p. 201. See http://
www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Publica-
tion/ACER%20Market%20Monitoring%20Report%202013.pdf
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(launched in mid-2013) and Slovakia (the interconnector was ac-
tivated in September 2014). It is technically possible for gas sup-
plies to Ukraine from Poland to reach 1.5 bcm per year, and 6.1 bcm 
per year from Hungary. In 2013, supplies to Ukraine from Poland 
and Hungary totalled 2.1 bcm. The vendor companies were RWE 
gas (from Poland) and GdF Suez (from Hungary). The deliveries 
have been carried out on an interruptible basis, hence the much 
lower volume than the technical possibilities would allow. In Sep-
tember 2014 deliveries from Slovakia to Ukraine were launched. 
The capacity of the Vojany-Uzhgorod gas pipeline, via which the 
supplies are to be delivered, is expected to reach 10 bcm in 2015 
(since September the gas supplies have been made on an inter-
ruptible basis, but from March 2015 it is planned to make delivery 
on a firm basis). Theoretically, the supply could be much higher 
with the use of reverse flow along the Brotherhood pipeline (up 
to 30 bcm), but Slovakia has consistently refused to agree on this 
with Ukraine because of legal complications – and probably also 
due to its reluctance to come into conflict with Gazprom. 
Statements by the Russian government and Gazprom representa-
tives have suggested that the gas reverses running from Central 
Europe to Ukraine are illegal19. In particular, the Russian side 
suggests that Ukraine is receiving gas not as part of the physical 
gas supply, but rather in the context of virtual reverses. Howev-
er, these reverses do have a physical nature, and the companies 
supplying gas buy it at the Western gas hubs and then make prof-
its associated with the opportunities to get higher prices on the 
Ukrainian market20. Despite this fact, it cannot be ruled out that 
19 Andrey Konoplyanik, ‘The role of “European formulas” in the Russia-
Ukraine gas debate’, European Energy Review, 4 August 2014; http://www.
europeanenergyreview.eu/site/pagina.php?id=4295
20 Simon Pirani, ‘Ukraine’s imports of Russian gas: how a deal might be 
reached’, Oxford Energy Comment, July 2014, p. 5-6. See http://www.ox-
fordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Ukraines-imports-
of-Russian-gas-how-a-deal-might-be-reached.pdf
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Russia will use some form of retaliation or pressure against coun-
tries or companies supplying gas to Ukraine. 
4. renegotiations of contracts 
Over the past several years, the conditions of long-term contracts 
have repeatedly been renegotiated within the EU. Gas customers 
began to demand a renegotiation of the terms of delivery, as the 
gas prices on the spot market in Western Europe were significant-
ly lower than they were under long-term contracts. Under strong 
pressure from their customers, some suppliers have agreed to re-
negotiate terms; for example in 2011 Gazprom changed the con-
ditions of supply for the Italian companies Edison and Sinergie 
Italiane, France’s GdF Suez, and Germany’s WIEH and Wingas. 
A year later there was a renegotiation of the terms of Russian gas 
supplies for the German E.ON Ruhrgas and the Dutch company 
GasTerra. 
Changes in contracts also followed in the Central European coun-
tries. Gazprom renegotiated its contracts with the Slovak com-
pany SPP, Austria’s Econgas, the Czech division of RWE Supply 
& Trading, and Poland’s PGNiG, among others (see Table 4). Most 
of these renegotiations were preceded by cases brought against 
Gazprom at arbitration tribunals, which were withdrawn after 
agreements had been reached (with the exception of the dispute 
between the Czech RWE and Gazprom). Because of trade secrecy, 
it is difficult to determine whether the renegotiations led only to 
a reduction in price or to changes in the existing pricing formulas 
in the contracts, i.e. introducing links to prices on the spot market. 
However, in the statements made by the representatives of Cen-
tral European companies, there are suggestions that the price for-
mulas have been modified, and now contain partial indexations to 
prices at Western hubs. This would confirm the assumption that 
the change in the situation on the Western European gas markets 
has indirectly strengthened the position of the Central European 
gas companies with regard to their main supplier Gazprom. 
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One of the most interesting examples of changes in the conditions 
of gas supplies in Central Europe took place between the Czech 
company RWE Supply & Trading and Gazprom. In contrast to 
other companies in the region, the dispute was only resolved by 
arbitration. The Russian company sued the Czechs for failing to 
repay their liabilities associated with the ‘take or pay’ clause. In 
October 2012, the court of arbitration in Vienna found in favour 
of the Czech company. RWE also questioned the pricing formu-
la in its contract with Gazprom, and the court of arbitration in 
Vien na also came down on its side on this issue (the judgment of 
June 2013 ordered the partial introduction of market indexation), 
and Gazprom was obliged to pay around €1 billion in damages in 
respect of the losses incurred by RWE21. It is believed that these 
two judgements have set a precedent for further appeals against 
contracts signed with Gazprom concerning interpretations of the 
‘take or pay’ clause and the introduction of market indexation.
21 RWE Annual Report 2013, ‘Shaping the future’. p. 23; See https://www.rwe.
com/web/cms/mediablob/en/2320248/data/110822/5/rwe/investor-rela-
tions/reports/RWE-Annual-Report-2013.pdf
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5. ownership changes in gas industries
In 2013, there was a wave of ownership changes among key gas 
companies in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. This 
covered the transmission operators in Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia, and key gas shipping, distribution and storage companies 
in Slovakia and Hungary. The transformation of ownership re-
vealed various trends on the Central European gas markets. In 
the Czech Republic the internationalisation of the gas sector is 
ongoing, while in Hungary efforts to re-nationalise can be seen. 
In Slovakia, the hybrid model of the state’s presence on the gas 
sector is being maintained; the state holds a majority stake in the 
gas infrastructure, but private investors are responsible for man-
agement. At the same time, the state has returned to occupy a key 
position in gas sales after more than a decade.
The largest-scale changes in ownership have taken place on the 
Slovak market. At the beginning of 2013, the French GdF Suez and 
German E.ON sold their stake in Slovak Gas Holding to the Czech 
energy group EPH for €2.6 billion. Thus, the Czech company EPH 
gained managerial control and 49% of the shares in the Eustream 
network transmission operator as well as the Nafta and Pozgas 
gas storage companies. EPH’s entry onto the Slovak gas transmis-
sion market can be explained by the Czech company’s ambitions 
to become a Central European energy company. EPH also compet-
ed (unsuccessfully) in the tender to acquire the Czech transmis-
sion system operator NET4GAS. At the same time, in September 
2013 the Slovak Treasury reached an agreement regarding the ac-
quisition of 100% of shares in SPP, which is the largest gas seller in 
Slovakia22. SPP’s acquisition by the state can be explained primar-
ily by the Slovak government’s desire to maintain low gas prices; 
it had in fact been involved in numerous previous disputes with 
22 Jakub Groszkowski, ‘Changes in ownership structure of the Slovak gas com-
pany SPP’, 11 September 2013. See http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
analyses/2013-09-11/changes-ownership-structure-slovak-gas-company-spp
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SPP’s partners concerning the company’s pricing policy. Gas pric-
es are of particularly political importance in Slovakia; in 2013, gas 
accounted for 29% of the country’s energy mix, the second highest 
in the region behind Hungary23. 
The ownership changes on the Czech market came in the form of 
the sale of the transmission operator NET4GAS by the German 
company RWE. The Czech operator’s new owners were the Ca-
nadian investment fund Borealis Infrastructure and the German 
fund Allianz Capital Partners (each has a 50% stake in NET4GAS); 
the transaction, concluded in March 2013, was worth €1.6 billion. 
It was the first example of international financial investors en-
tering the gas transmission sector in Central Europe. The Czech 
market is following the same kind of changes which took place 
on the German market, where we can also see the acquisition of 
network operators by financial investors. The transaction has 
maintained the high level of internationalisation in the Czech gas 
sector; the state does not control the companies selling gas, and it 
is not present in the gas infrastructure. The only state entity op-
erating on the Czech gas market is the OTE company, the operator 
of the energy market. 
On the Hungarian market, the E.ON Földgáz Trade (the main 
importer of Russian gas to Hungary) and E.ON Földgáz Stor-
age companies (which controls most of the gas storage in Hun-
gary) have been sold. These subsidiaries of the German company 
E.ON were acquired for €870 million by MVM, the state’s energy 
group which was so far mainly active in power sector. In recent 
years, MVM has become active on the gas market; it is a share-
holder in the construction of the Hungarian section of the South 
Stream pipeline, and it is foreseen that its subsidiary MGT will 
become a transmission operator for the Hungarian-Slovak gas 
connector (although it has not yet received certification). All the 
changes in the Hungarian gas market could be seen as a part of 
23 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014, p. 41.
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a process of ‘re-nationalising’ the sector. It is likely that MVM’s 
entry onto the gas sales market is intended to serve the national 
strategy of maintaining low gas prices. The price of gas has great 
political significance in Hungary, among other reasons because 
of the very high share of gas in the national energy mix (almost 
38%24). Strengthening MVM’s position in the gas sector may also 
be part of a comprehensive strategy regarding Hungary’s energy 
relationship with Russia. MVM is in fact responsible for imple-
menting two strategic investments made jointly with Russia: the 
Hungarian section of the South Stream gas pipeline, and the ex-
pansion of the Hungarian nuclear power plant in Paks. In addi-
tion, at the end of 2015, the contract for the supply of Russian gas 
expires, and the acquisition of E.ON Földgáz Trade by MVM, the 
main company-importer, is likely to strengthen Hungary’s posi-
tion in the next round of its contract negotiations with Gazprom.
24 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014, p. 41.
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III. towardS a cEntral EuropEan gaS 
markEt 
The gradual liberalisation of gas markets in Central Europe and 
the reform of the market organisation model raise the question of 
whether the region is able to repeat the success of Western Euro-
pean gas hubs, the more so as increasingly strong trends towards 
the regionalisation of markets can be seen within the EU. The pro-
ject of linking national markets is contained in the postulates of 
the ‘Gas Target Model’, a non-binding vision of a future EU com-
mon market which was adopted in 2011. Currently there is an in-
tense debate in Central Europe on the creation of a regional gas 
market. Specific projects to strengthen cooperation are also be-
ing developed, the ultimate aim of which may be the creation of 
a common market area in Central Europe. However, the effects of 
regional integration have so far been quite limited. 
1. regionalisation of gas markets within the Eu 
Hitherto, the creation of a common market has mainly been a ‘top 
down’ process, i.e. the preparation and implementation of pan-
European regulation (the third energy package, network codes). 
The ‘bottom-up’ approach to creating a common gas market 
(strengthening regional cooperation) has not been of substantial 
significance, and has complemented ‘top-down’ processes to only 
a small degree. For example, the Gas Regional Initiatives, begun in 
2006, and aimed at strengthening the process of building a joint 
market, has had only limited effects. The Visegrad Group coun-
tries, together with Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Romania, 
Slovenia and Italy, have been included in the Gas Regional Initia-
tive Southern and South Eastern Europe (GRI SSE). The hetero-
geneity and large number of the participants in the group mean 
that the GRI SEE has not been effective, and its activities have so 
far focused mainly on exchanges of experiences between energy 
regulators and network operators. A communiqué from the Eu-
ropean Commission on regional initiatives had already suggested 
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the need to change the shape of the ‘south, south-east’ region in 
2010, because of the varying size and different interests of the re-
gion’s members25. 
Activities related to the regional dimension of the process of 
building a common market revived only after the adoption of the 
third liberalisation package. This reinforced the independence of 
the regulatory authorities, and forced closer cooperation between 
regulators and network operators through the establishment of 
ACER and ENTSOG. At the same time, the third package opened 
up a broad discussion on the future development of the common 
market. In fact, discussions concerning future gas market revived 
debates on regional dimension of the single market, and have led 
to a number of actors (both state and company) getting involved in 
the design of different configurations for regional market areas. 
It started from an expansion in belief in the need for a compre-
hensive vision of the functioning and organisation of the gas mar-
ket, which would represent a kind of signpost in the preparation 
and subsequent implementation of EU regulations. Formal work 
on such a prospect, referred to as the ‘Gas Target Model’ (GTM), 
began in late 2010 during the Madrid Forum. This is the EU’s for-
mat for informal discussions on issues related to the single gas 
market, which involved the entire spectrum of actors operating in 
the gas markets – representatives of regulatory authorities, mem-
ber states, the European Commission, transmission system op-
erators, suppliers, traders, gas exchanges, etc., as well as research 
institutes and consulting firms. The most important proposals for 
the GTM were presented by the Florence School of Regulation, the 
Clingendael Institute from the Netherlands, and the consulting 
firms Frontier Economics and LECG26. 
25 Communiqué from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, ‘The future Role of Regional Initiatives /COM/2010/0721’. See 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52010DC0721 
26 The most important publications on the Gas Target Model include: 
Sergio Ascari, ‘An American Model for the EU Gas Market?’, Florence School 
of Regulation, EUI Working Paper, June 2011; 
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After extensive consultation, the Council of European Energy 
Regulators – starting first and foremost with the MECO-S model 
presented by the Florence School of Regulation – developed a vi-
sion of a target model for the gas market27. It was then adopted by 
the Madrid Forum in March 2012. Although the document is not 
legally binding, its significance is important. It sets out the main 
framework for the organisation of the gas sector, which is to be 
taken into account as part of the process of further regulating the 
gas market (including network codes). In accordance with the ap-
proved vision, an ‘ideal’ European gas market would consist of 
a network of closely interrelated wholesale markets. Each mar-
ket should have an appropriate size (minimum consumption of 20 
bcm per year), level of diversification (supplies from at least three 
sources) and levels of concentration and liquidity on the market 
(as measured by the HHI index, which describes the degree of 
domination by the biggest sellers in the market; and by the rate 
of ‘churn’, which measures the liquidity of the market). The model 
assumes that if the market areas are unable to meet these criteria, 
they should then be combined into larger regions. The only state 
that currently meets all the GTM’s requirements is the UK. Mean-
while, the requirement that the market have an appropriate size 
(consumption of more than 20 bcm per year) has only been met 
by six markets – France, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, Great 
Britain and Italy. So in effect, the model predicts a large scale of 
changes – most of the national gas markets will disappear, and in 
their place will be built larger, transnational areas, each with its 
own gas trading point. 
Jean-Michel Glachant, ‘A vision for the EU target model: the MECO-S Model’, 
Florence School of Regulation, EUI Working Papers, June 2011; 
‘CIEP Vision on the Gas Target Model’, the Clingendael International Energy 
Programme, Clingendael Energy Paper, August 2011; 
‘Target Model for the European Natural Gas Market, A report prepared for 
GDF Suez Branche Infrastructures’, Frontier Economics, June 2011; 
‘Market design for natural gas: the target model for the internal market’, 
LECG study, March 2011.
27 ‘CEER Vision for a European Gas Target Model. Conclusion Paper’, Council of 
European Energy Regulators, 1 December 2011.
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This vision, as presented, sparked a number of controversies. The 
main subject of the dispute was whether the spot markets, clearly 
promoted in the GTM, were able to guarantee the security of gas 
supplies. Some participants in the debate, including the Dutch 
Clingendael institute, emphasised that while constructing a mod-
el of a well-functioning common EU gas market, the focus should 
be on ensuring the stability of gas supplies, and not on the devel-
opment of spot markets, which by their very nature are volatile. 
Another key challenge is the high cost of establishing large mar-
ket areas. For example, the need for heavy infrastructure invest-
ments discouraged the German regulator from plans for merging 
two existing market areas, GASPOOL and NCG28. Controversy was 
also sparked by the arbitrarily accepted GTM indicators, as well 
as by certain methodological difficulties. For example, a range of 
different methods exist for counting ‘churn’ ratio, and measuring 
the number of supply sources raises disputes of interpretation. 
Another problem is that the criteria adopted in the GTM are too 
strict and do not reflect the enormous diversity of gas markets 
in the EU. For these reasons, the ACER is now working on a pos-
sible modification of the GTM assumptions which will take into 
account the significant differences between the levels of develop-
ment of the gas markets in the different regions of the EU. 
Despite these controversies, some of the European gas markets 
are in fact evolving in accordance with the demands contained in 
the GTM. There have been few examples of consolidation in larg-
er, regional and transnational market areas. One example of this 
might be the consolidation of the gas markets in France, where 
the number of distinct market areas was reduced from five in 
2005 to three in 2009. The French regulator has promised to cre-
ate one zone by the end of 2018. Another example was establish-
ment of special market zone (trading region) between two of the 
28 ‘German regulator erases hope of NCG-GASPOOL natural gas market zone 
merger’. See http://www.icis.com/resources/news/2013/03/20/9651776/ger-
man-regulator-erases-hope-of-ncg-gaspool-natural-gas-market-zone-merger/
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Austrian market’s three zones and the German NCG market area 
in October 2013 (the so-called COSIMA project29). This project is 
the result of the good connection between both the western Aus-
trian zones with the German market, in the absence of physical 
connections between the western Austrian zones and the eastern 
part of the country. In mid-2014 a preliminary draft was put for-
ward for a merger of the gas markets of Portugal and Spain, the 
so-called Iberian project30. Also, a project is being developed to 
create a new entry-exit zone which will cover the gas connector 
between Great Britain and Belgium. The preliminary draft was 
presented in April 201431. Finally, the integration plans also in-
clude two projects in Central Europe (see section 3.2). 
2. market integration projects in central Europe 
The debate over the Gas Target Model (GTM) has sparked a discus-
sion on the possibility of creating a Central European gas market 
within the region’s countries. This is because no country in the 
region meets the criteria for a GTM; the markets are too small, not 
nearly liquid enough, and the level of competition on the whole-
sale markets is insufficient (see Table 5). The GTM project assumes 
that a functional market must show a consumption of at least 20 
bcm (at least 215 TWh), which means that only Poland has a chance 
of reaching that level in the future. In terms of liquidity, no mar-
ket in the area meets the criteria for a well-functioning market. 
The Austrian CEGH hub has some liquidity, but compared to other 
hubs in North-West Europe (such as the German) it is quite low. 
29 ‘Market model, Description of the new 2013 gas market model’. See http://
www.aggm.at/en/legal-framework/market-model
30 ‘Study about models for integration of the Spanish and Portuguese gas mar-
kets in a common Iberian natural gas market’, Public consultation docu-
ment, 6 June 2014. See http://www.erse.pt/pt/consultaspublicas/consultas/
Documents/47/20140606%20-%20IntegrationofSpainandPortugal.pdf
31 CAM and ZIGMA Concept Document, 8 April 2014, Industry Consultation. 
See http://www.fluxys.com/belgium/en/Services/Transmission/Market-
Consultations/~/media/Files/Services/Transmission/ConsultationPlat-
form/Consultation9/Fluxys_140408_ConceptDocument_ZIGMA.ashx
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The indicators measuring the level of competition on the market 
(HHI and RSI) are also highly unsatisfactory. The failure to meet 
any of the GTM criteria has meant that discussions  in the region 
on the possibility of merging markets are beginning. This is still 
a debate among experts, which is de facto taking place among rep-
resentatives of the energy regulators and transmission system 
operators. The most important current initiative is a project to 
create a trading region between Austria, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, as well as the project for the closer integration of the 
Visegrad Group countries.
Table 5. GTM criteria in Central Europe32
gtm 
criteria churn
Size of mar-
ket (twh)
number of 
sources HHI
32 rSI
Austria 3 105 3 3371 143%
Czech 
Republic 0 95 3 5370 525%
Slovakia 0 70 2 7388 369%
Poland 0 193 3 9600 56%
Hungary 0 113 4 2875 60%
GTM >8 >215 >3 >2000 >110%
Source: Frontier Economics, ‘Wholesale market functioning: GTM1 criteria’, 
2nd ACER Workshop on Gas Target Model review and update, 19 March 2014; 
see http://www.acer.europa.eu/Media/Events/2nd-ACER-Gas-Target-Model-
Stakeholder-Workshop/Documents/02%20Frontier%20Lochner%20Whole-
sale%20market%20functioning%20GTM%201%20criteria.pdf
32 The methodology for calculating the HHI indicators adopted by Frontier 
Economics differs significantly from the classical understanding of this in-
dicator, which is why the table gives the HHI based on data from the Euro-
pean Commission in 2011, which in turn is based on information from the 
national regulators.
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The process of integrating the gas markets of the Visegrad Group 
stems from the initiative to build a North-South corridor. The de-
bate on strengthening cooperation in the security of supplies and 
increasing physical connections in the region gradually turned into 
a debate on the possibility of creating a regional gas market. The 
framework for cooperation on integrating the Visegrad Group’s gas 
markets were formally set out in a memorandum on the integration 
of markets in October 2012 signed by the Visegrad Group’s economic 
ministers. In 2012, the regulatory authorities of the Visegrad Group 
prepared an analysis of the liquidity of their markets, and in 2013 
a conceptual analysis on the possibility of integrating the V4 mar-
kets was published33. The analysis did not suggest a final market 
design for the region, but rather a flexible formula for integration, 
i.e. the development of various integration initiatives which would 
also go beyond cooperation within the Visegrad Group. 
At the same time, the analysis highlighted the need to complete 
the liberalisation of the domestic gas markets, the strengthen-
ing of the free movement of gas transmission within the region 
(building infrastructure, introducing bundled and bi-directional 
capacity products), and strengthening cooperation in the imple-
mentation of the network codes. The so-called roadmap for the 
regional gas market, which was signed by the Prime Ministers of 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary in June 2013, 
repeats most of these proposals34. It does not determine the model 
of integration; there is no decision of whether there should be mar-
ket coupling (the lowest degree of integration), a trading region, 
or also a single entry-exit zone market area. The roadmap empha-
sises the need for developing the infrastructure, in particular the 
Polish-Czech, Polish-Slovak and Slovak-Hungarian connectors. 
The document also establishes a new institutional framework for 
V4 cooperation, the V4 Forum for Gas Market Integration, a special 
33 Sergio Ascari, ‘Gas Target Model for Visegrad Region’, OSW Report, June 2013.
34 ‘Road map towards a common regional V4 gas market’, see http://www.tok-
io.msz.gov.pl/resource/38228d71-c251-4929-b150-4cc7761a0acf:JCR
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meeting of regulators, operators and market participants which 
will host the debate on deeper integration. The year of the Forum’s 
operation suggests that cooperation is evolving towards a com-
mon implementation of the network codes and the coordination of 
actions in gas supply security (developing preventative regional 
plans in the event of interruptions). At the same time, a project is 
being developed to harmonise concessions for gas trading compa-
nies in the region35. However, there have been no reports on a pos-
sible model for the integration of markets. The study on market 
coupling between the Visegrad Group’s markets which was sug-
gested in the Roadmap as a possible first step towards reaching 
a final market design has still not been published. 
The second project for closer integration is the idea to construct an 
Austrian-Czech-Slovak gas trading region, the so-called CEE trad-
ing region. This envisages the creation of single entry-exit zone for 
three countries, where border points in the transmission network 
among these countries are irrelevant for shippers. The draft stipu-
lates that the common area would have a single, common ‘virtual’ 
point of trade, but at the same time the national balancing systems 
would be preserved. As a consequence, there would be a single 
price for gas on the wholesale market in all the countries partici-
pating in the project. Two studies have been prepared within the 
project: one which shows the macroeconomic benefits of merging 
the markets, and a conceptual study of the principles on which the 
gas trading region would be based36. Studies show that the creation 
of a common trade area is possible at a relatively low cost, due to 
the lack of any need to build new infrastructure (it would probably 
only be necessary to build a Czech-Austrian interconnector) and 
the relatively small changes necessary to the regulatory regimes. 
Nevertheless, the project is currently in suspension, due to a lack 
of commitment from all the participants. The Czech operator and 
35 Gas Regional Initiative, GRI Progress Report, Spring 2014, p. 13.
36 E-Control; ‘Studies, Cross-border Market Integration’, see http://www.e-
control.at/en/publications/studies/cross-border-market-integration
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the Austrian regulator have consistently promoted the project, em-
phasising the important regional role of the CEGH gas hub and the 
ease of integrating the markets. They stress that the trading region 
could be expanded at a later stage to include other states, such as 
Hungary, Poland or Slovenia. However, the project does not enjoy 
strong support from the three participating countries (no official 
positions have been adopted at the political level) or from the Czech 
or Slovak regulators. The Slovak transmission operator has ex-
pressed its scepticism about the project, and withdrew from it after 
the change to the ownership structure. The reasons for its with-
drawal from the project are unknown, but we can assume that the 
idea of creating a trading region will meet resistance from Slova-
kia, which may fear a loss of part of its income from the transfer of 
almost 60 bcm of gas per year if the fees on the borders with Austria 
and the Czech Republic are eliminated. 
The integration processes within the Visegrad Group and the 
Austrian-Czech-Slovak trade area are often, mistakenly, seen 
as competing projects. In fact, it is fairly difficult to compare the 
projects. They propose completely different formulas and degrees 
of cooperation in the integration of their respective markets. The 
Austrian-Czech-Slovak project should be regarded as one of the 
most ambitious integration projects currently being proposed in 
the EU. It assumes a degree of market integration which would 
immediately precede the stage of a full merger, i.e. the creation of 
a trans-national entry-exit zone. In contrast, the Visegrad initia-
tive provides for co-operation in the construction of infrastruc-
ture and the implementation of network codes, but does not at this 
stage propose any specific design model for the regional market. 
Thus, this initiative appears less ambitious in terms of the depth 
of integration. In contrast to the putative Austrian-Czech-Slovak 
trading area, the Visegrad plan does not provide for the integra-
tion of markets that lie solely within the East-West transport cor-
ridor. Thus in the long run, it offers greater opportunities to di-
versify the gas supply sources, and to lead to a more liquid Central 
European market. 
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3. prospects 
At this stage, it is difficult to determine whether the Central Euro-
pean region will be able to make one single central European gas 
market, understood not only as an area of  free movement for gas, 
but also as a common regulatory area with a single gas hub. The 
idea of  a Central European gas market, thus understood, remains 
a rather appealing vision that will nevertheless be very difficult to 
realise in practice. The barriers to its implementation include the 
complexity of the process of integrating the various markets. This 
will require agreement on at least three levels: political, regula-
tory and among the transmission operators. This means that for 
the integration of the three countries into one market area,  the 
integration process will have to be worked out among nine actors. 
However, the experience of the integration of power markets, 
a process far more advanced than that of a common gas market, 
indicates that cooperation is not impossible, even within such 
a wide and diverse group. The electricity markets have in fact suc-
ceeded in linking their markets by means of a mechanism called 
market coupling, applying to the markets of the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Hungary. Work is currently underway on the possi-
bility of expanding the area to include Poland and Romania. 
Political questions offer both an opportunity and a threat to the 
process of creating regional market. The idea of  building a Cen-
tral European gas market should enjoy strong political support 
among all the Central European countries, because in the long 
run it would strengthen their position towards the predominant 
supplier, and would also be a step preceding the creation of a pan-
European common gas market. The existence of a number of in-
frastructural connections in the region will improve security of 
supply, and will prevent external suppliers from dividing up the 
individual national markets (by using different prices for differ-
ent states). At the same time, a regional market will be beneficial 
from the point of view of promoting competition, thereby lower-
ing prices. On the other hand, closer integration – moving beyond 
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simply expanding the transmission infrastructure, and into the 
area of establishing a regional market area – would mean depriv-
ing individual states of some of their autonomy in managing their 
own gas markets. Currently, Slovakia and Hungary are strongly 
emphasising the need to reduce gas prices for individual custom-
ers. If they are integrated within a wider regional market, contin-
uing this policy will be difficult, because in the long term integra-
tion will have to lead to the harmonisation of prices. At the same 
time, deeper integration could reduce the influence of individual 
transit operators. Thus, countries in the region may face the di-
lemma of whether to deepen integration and expect that greater 
competition on the market will lead to lower gas prices, or wheth-
er to retain a greater degree of autonomy and interfere with the 
tariffs and the prices on the domestic markets. 
The great complexity of the integration process and the high politi-
cisation of the gas issue in each country makes it most likely that 
the status quo of gas market integration will be maintained. Inte-
gration will be limited mainly to the harmonised implementation 
of EU regulations and the development of cross-border infrastruc-
ture. The near future will not see the implementation of the am-
bitious integration projects providing for a merger or a very close 
connection of the markets in the region. Consequently, it is unlike-
ly that a gas hub will arise in the region which could be comparable 
to those operating in the West. It is more likely that local hubs will 
develop, which will be primarily of national importance. This will 
mean that companies will continue to trade mostly on more liquid 
Western gas hubs. This will lead to a preservation of the Central Eu-
ropean gas markets’ peripheral position in the EU. They will ‘orbit’ 
individually around the more developed hubs in the West: Poland 
probably around the German hubs (NCG and GASPOOL), while the 
remaining countries of the Visegrad Group will gravitate towards 
trading at the Austrian CEGH hub. 
An enormous challenge to the integration of gas markets in Central 
Europe – even if understood as just an extension of infrastructural 
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connections and the gradual harmonisation of regulations – is the 
Russian-Ukrainian conflict currently developing. Russia’s an-
nexation of Crimea, and Russian support for the separatists op-
erating in eastern Ukraine, have led to an unprecedented crisis 
in relations between Moscow and Kiev. This is also affecting en-
ergy relations between the two countries. In June 2014, Russia cut 
gas supplies to Ukraine, and in August the Ukrainian parliament 
passed a law allowing the suspension of Russian gas transit to the 
EU as part of any sanctions imposed on Russia. 
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the threat to suspend Rus-
sian gas transit through Ukraine should strengthen the will to 
cooperate between the Central European states in the integra-
tion of their gas markets. An average of 50% of Russian gas sup-
plies reaches the EU through Ukraine (data for 2012; before the 
activation of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, transit via Ukraine 
amounted to 80% of supplies to the EU). The suspension of such 
a large quantity of supplies for an extended period of time would 
lead to a serious shortage on the European markets, and would 
be particularly acute for countries in Central Europe, which are 
traditionally heavily dependent on Russian supplies. 
However, the Russian-Ukrainian crisis is also fostering a deepen-
ing of political differences among the countries of Central Europe. 
While Poland strongly supports Ukraine, Hungary has emphasised 
the need to maintain good relations with Russia, and together with 
Austria has offered strong support for the South Stream gas pipe-
line. Work on expanding the cross-border connections along the 
North-South line will not be suspended, but the individual strate-
gies of individual countries for maintaining good energy relations 
with Russia may reduce the chances of creating a coherent, region-
al gas market with a number of alternative gas supply sources. 
tomaSZ dąBorowSkI
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for Central Europe
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companies’ reports
